w ould seem to support the id ea that Polisli Atl anticism is d eepl y ent ren che d and caused , at least in part . b y stro ng histori cal bonds.
The cama raderie betw een Poland and the U S is furth er stre ngt he ne d by e th nic. cultural and ideol o gical ties, whi ch remain a co nsta nt co ntrib u ting facto r to Pol ish Atlanticism , For instance, in an April 28th, 20 0:\ int ervi ew in Warsaw , th en-Presid ent Kwasniewski state d that mu ch o f Poland's close relationship w ith the U S could be attributed to the fact th at " [ajln ios t nine million people in tlie United States ack nowled ge th eir Polish roots. O nly Warsaw has m ore Pol es Jivin g there tlian the state o f New York . So o ur feelin gs for America arc ve ry strong" (" Po land's Kwas n iew ski Vie ws Po stwar Iraq, T ies with U S. EU, Russia, O w n Future," 28 Apr. 0:\). Ad ditionally, th en-foreign minister Wlodzimierz Ci moszew icz state d in a 200:\ interview th at afte r September 11 th, Poland " supported the peopl e and th e values that had been attacked " (" Po lish For eign Minister on US-European R elations, Plan e Acquisition , Iraq ") . The state men ts of these Poli sh leaders wo uld see m to suggest that P oland 's friend ship w ith th e U S is an in he re n t feature of th e nati onal identity due to the ethnic , cultural and ideological ties between th e tw o nations. If th ese static fact o rs w ere to be accepted as the sole raison detre behind Polish Arlanticism, it w ould appear that Poland 's robust Atl anticism pri or to 2004 w as au to m atic and inflexible in nature .
A BACKGROUND OF "TRANSATLANTIC DRIFT"
The app earance of intrau sient Polish Atl anticism between 1999 an d 2004 is furthe r strengt hened b y the context of "transatlantic drift" in which it occurred . Sch o lars have pointed to th e presen ce of " a deep split .. .dev eloping .. .between the United State s and w estern Eu rope" even prior to th e (Illout ov er Ir aq (Lu nd estad 25) . Two m ajor causes for thi s in crease in co nflict are th e " the inc reasing unilareralism of the United States" and an " E U [which] is gr owing closer togeth er" (Lundestad 16, 26) . As European integration has accelerated in th e 21st century, the EU has b ec ome stronger and more abl e to challenge the formerly unri valed influence of the world's curr ent hegemon . The in cre asing tendency of Europe to lo ok inward for leade rship rather th an to the U S, as w ell as the hei ghtened frequ ency o f critiq ues o f US unilarerali sm , po int to a net-decr ease o f European Atlanticism in the years before 2004.
Thus, any demonstration o f Poland's Atlantic orientation during thi s period took place against a prev ailin g trend of " transatlant ic drifi ." When co m b in ed with th e foundation o f Polish Atlanricism in intran sient factors suc h as ideological, ethnic and hi stori c ties, it m ay ;lpp ear to som e th at Pol and 's pro-US ori entati on during the time was fund amental, instin ctu al and un assailable. This id ea is well-illustrat ed in a M ay 2003 pie ce in th e London T imes, which states " Po les and Ameri cans have co me to a shared understanding of the world .. . rAJ self-co nfide nt East (perhaps lead by Pol and) could h elp to correct r" a wave of p ostArlanti cisni in Western Europe "] .. .for th e regi on has nev er lost its faith in the American dream " (Bo yes). H o we ver, a clo ser examinati on o f th e m oti ves behind Pol and's Atlanricisr stance prior to 2004 demon strates that a su bsta ntial part of thi s orientati on was not au to m atic but was driv en by changeable calculatio ns of national intere st in terms o f political influ en ce , econo m ic concerns and security issues of th e time.
POLISH ATLANTICISM: POLAND'S PREFERENCE FOR NATO
Poland 's Atl antic tend en cie s between 1<)99 and 2004 we re manifested in a strong predilection for U S leadership in defense and sec urit y m att er s. The most co m pe lling exa m ple of th e profu ndity o f Polish Atlanti cism o n the se issues was Poland' s stro ng endo rseme nt of the suprema cy and preferability of NA T O to th e Eur op ean Sec urity and Defe nse Policy (ESO P) in th e years befor e 2004.
The ESO P repr esent s th e creati on of a securi ty force capable of carry in g out peacekeeping, peace-making, humanitarian and crisis managem ent tasks, und er th e jurisdicti on of the E U and operatio nal o utside of NATO's aut hori ty (H aine 44). Developm ent of the ESOP ent ails th e EU "aquir jing] th e capacities and capabil ities... to execut e [a milit ary] ope ration .. .using Europ ean assets.. .[with] auton om ous action " (Boyer 4) . O f course, the 199R St. M alo agreeme nt founding ESOP states th at its members must act " in co nform iry wi th [their] respec tive o bligatio ns in NA T O " CSt. Ma lo Declaration ," qed. in Haine 43). Thu s, in p rinc iple, ESO P repres ent s a balance " betw een the auto nomy asserted" by the EU and a continuing co m mitment to "c o nformity wit h the Atlantic Allian ce" (Hain e 43). H owever, thi s [ IC t was often buri ed und er a tan gled web of diplomatic, political and economic co ntroversies that arose aro und this issue.
The prima ry poin t of co ntentio n ove r ESOP develo pme nt was that it was ofte n seen to repres en t a threat to th e integri ty and prima cy of NATO as the dominant enforcer of European security. As Hain e explains in his articl e on the topi c, " this new European structure gave the United States th e impression that th e ESOP woul d becom e a rival." alth ou gh he states th at thi s imp ression was not entirely justified (137) . This pe rcept ion was present in 2003, w hen "in late April, Schroder, C hirac and th eir Belgian and Luxemb ourg co unterparts ostent atiously met. . .. to start a European defe nse avan t-garde that the United States und erstood as a challenge to NATO and Am erican leadership " (Po nd 49). Whether or not ESO P trul y imperils NATO is a point that co ntinues to be up for debate. H o wever , th e part of the issue pertinent to a discussion of Polish Atlanticism is that ESOP was ofte n perceived as a threat to NATO du ring this period , both by Polish leadership and by dominant voices in the first Bus h administratio n.
III kee ping with thi s stro ng Atlanticism. Poland vehe me nt ly defend ed the supre mac y of N AT O ove r ESO P in th e years lead ing up to 2004 . The Poles' stance o n this matt er was largely con gru ent with the Americans'; an "issue w here W arsaw 's and Was hingt on's positions bro adly co nverged has been th e EU's plan to develop .. .ESOP ... with the capabili ty of undert akin g defense and security opera tio ns aut on om ou s of NATO authority (Z aboro wski and Lon ghu rst 101(l). Du ring th is period , the Polish governme nt o fficially "ac ce ptjed]" ESOP; h owe ver, any endorsem ent of it was alw ays qualifi ed with th e un conditi on al caveat that "the EU should never strive to substitu te for NATO " (T rzasko wski, "Poland" 20) . Illustrati ve of Poland' s stance on th e issue are its leaders' 2003 reactions to a discussion regarding ESO P at an O cto ber 16-1 7th EU leaders' sum mit. T hese includ e then Prim e M inister Leszek M iller declarin g Polish oppositio n to "a ny Europ ean de fense force th at wou ld pro vide an 'alte rnative' to NATO, " as well as Poland's amb assador to N ATO stating th at "E U defense mu st 'supplem ent' NATO instead of ,replacing' it" ("FMA 12 Nov") . In sum , th e Polish stance prior to 200 4 was characterized by reserve towards ESO P , and a veh em ent de fense of NA TO as the pr incipal and domin ant mech anism for Europ ean security.
As Lu ndestad put s it, "NATO has be en th e USA 's pr imary instrument for taki ng charge in Atlantic affairs " (28) . Insofar as Am erica has b een th e traditi onal leader of the Allian ce, Poland' s co ntin ued devot ion to NATO abo ve all othe r security instituti on s does seem to indica te a deep-seated pr o-US ori enta tio n. T o some , Poland 's stro ng prefere nce for the primacy of N AT O ov er ESO P befor e 2004 co uld be viewe d as illustrative of an Polish Atlanticism in the 21st Century unquestioning Atlanricism motivated sol ely by respect for th e deeply entren ch ed historic, id eol ogi cal and ethni c ties which fonn th e un changing roots o f Po land 's friendship with the U S. H o wever, a m ore co m p re he nsive an alysis o f the m otivati on s behind Polan d 's stance o n ESDP points to th e fact that the state's Atl anri cism OJl th is issue was more st rateg ic than automa tic, and w as in part dri ven by calculatio ns o f nati on al int erest.
The fIrSt of th ese strate gic moti vati ons wa s Poland 's desire to assert influ en ce and occup y a position of lead ership in matters pertaining to its sec ur ity and defense. For instance , th e 1999 Helsinki m eeting establishing th e "Headline G oals" for ESDP dev elopment resulted in an agreem ent wh ich stated th at any non-EU European nation could co nt ribute to crisis man agement mi ssion s, but would have no decision-making ability within th em, which " was co nsequen tly vie wed by Warsaw as un sati sfact ory" (Za bo ro ws ki and Longhurst 1017 ). In co nt rast, security o rga n izatio ns under th e full auth ori ty of NATO were see n as " mo re inclusive, as [they] (Duke 5) . It appeared to Poland at th e tim e th at thi s " EU3" constitu ted most of the drive behind ESDP d evel opment, a lead er ship body whi ch see m ed poi sed to co nt in ue in th e future . Thus, it is understandabl e that "Warsaw ... reacted with skepticism towards the pro spect of an emerging Franco-Brirish-Cennan dircctoirc as a leading gr oup in European sec ur ity matters " (Z ab orowski 21) . Additionally, events suc h as Chirac's sco ld ing of Poland's suppo rt for the US ' intentions toward Iraq in 2003 cau sed Poland to assume that their voice o n d efense and security issues w ould m ost likel y be co -op ted by m ore-established EU countries. In short, th e C h irac " incid ent illustrated ... It]h e assum pt io n that th e ac cessio n countries...sho uld be co m pliant with the larger M ember States .. . [and] [t]h at the acceding countries sho uld not assum e equal wei ght in ... security matters w hich are view ed primarily as th e d omain of the larger member stat es" (Duke 4) .
In co ntrast, th e co nt inuation of a U S-led NATO as the primary vehicl e for European sec u rity seemed to pr omise Poland a leadership rol e, an issue which will be furth er ex plo red in the di scu ssion o f the Iraq W ar in the next sect io n. As stated in a 2002 Warsaw R zeczp ospolita articl e , " as. .. our position in the Europ ean Union is un certain , Poland has no altern ative but to tighten its allian ce w ith Washington . This is the o nly insurance poli cy access ible to us" ("An alyst Views Arguments For, Again st Polish lnvolvemenr in US -L ed Stri ke o n Iraq"). Like man y other less-p owerful European co u ntries. Poland saw a Europe d ominated by Euro-giants, such as Fran ce , as presentin g strict limits on its ability to occupy a position o f an y significan ce. Ameri ca's co nt inued inv olvement in European politics and ;Iffilirs represented , to so me extent, a check o n this trend o f increa sing d omin ation by European power-poles in thi s realm. As R oberto Ducci said o f the comparabl e Italian view point regarding US versus Fren ch influence in European politi cs, "the richest and farthest ma ster http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/12 is alw ays best" (qtd. in Nuti 177). In sum, even with E U membe rship in sig ht, N AT O see m ed to offer Po land th e co nt in ued p osition as a co -l ead e r while ESOP appeare d likel y to sub o rd inate the nati on to the w h ims of E U gian ts. Th u s, th e ex te nt to w hic h Pol and 's strategic calc u lations of ho w best to exert in flue nce ca n no t be underestim ared as a m oti ve fo r p re fe rr ing NATO o ve r ESO P , mak in g their Atlanticism see m slig htly less unqu estionin g and intransient.
Sec o nd, Po land's pr efe ren ce for NAT O over ESO P was in part m ot ivated by vari able eco no m ic cos t-benefi t calc ulatio ns in terms of co ntrib utio ns a nd e xp ect ed ga ins. Acco rdin g to W ad e J aco by, in the first years of th e 2 1st ce n tury, Po lan d demo nstrated a " pro fo u nd reluct ance to spe nd m oney o n m ilitary m odernizati on at a tim e w hen so n lany o the r d o m estic need s seernj ed] to deserve high priority " (jacoby 234). Addi tio nally, " hig h CEE infl at ion rapi dly eroded defe nse budget s" in countries such as Pol and (jacoby 238) . Yet, a n ation so h istorically prone to in vasio n could not be left undefend ed . NAT O offe red Polan d th e answer. In th e years before 2003, " th e governm e nt of th e U n ited S tates mad e <I conside red j u dgm e nt to trad e awa y pre ssu re on th e newe r NATO m embers to up grade th ei r mi litary capab ilities in exc h ange fo r d isplays of p oliti cal loyalty " (jac o b y 232) . T h us, the co st for Po land's protect ion via NAT O was alm ost exclusively limited to Poland 's suppo rt o f th e Un ited Sta res (suc h as in Iraq) . Prior to 2004 , thi s support see m ed a cheap price to p ay in co m pariso n to th e cos t of m o dernizin g th eir mi litary, and e ve n see med to promise to b rin g with it a wh ole range of ben efits, as will be exa mi n ed in th e n e xt se cti on o f th is pap e r. T h us, before 2004, Poland and othe r " CEE gover nments ... fou nd it easie r to de live r policy lo yalty tha n military co m pe te nce " (lacob y 24 9).
T herefo re , N AT O acco mmodated Poland's inab ilit y to P<l Y for expensive mode rnizatio n initiatives, whil e no ne the less guaranteeing its sec u rity th ro ugh th e provisions o f Article 5. O n the o ther h an d , m any in Poland "voiced co nce rn ab out the cos t of a separate European defen se" ("FMA 12 Nov") . Poland had no reaso n to expect that the EU leaders wo u ld be as accom modat ing as w as th e US in terms of ex pe ct ed co n rribu rio ns , suc h as th ose o u tli ned in th e H elsin ki H eadlin e GO<lIs. T h us, th e fac t th at NA T O represented a mu ch ch eape r way o f sec uri ng its defen se can n ot be un derest imated as a Illative for Poland 's sup po rt of th e prim acy of a U S-led NAT O in Euro p ean secu rity , and th e depth of th eir Atl anticism must b e assessed ac cordingly.
Fin ally, th e P olish p osit ion o n ESO P an d NAT O before 2004 was to some d egree m oti vated by stra tegic calc ula tions of th e relati ve via bility a nd effec tive ne ss of th e two secur ity regim es, especially with regard to Pola nd's co nti n ued percepti o n of a Russian threat. According to Z ab orowski and Longhurst , " Po land' s positi o n ... borderin g th e forme r Sovie t Uni on m eans th at Poland' s secu rity poli cies. . .remain ...fixa te d with the issue of territorial defe nse . . . Unsurprisingl y, th er e remai n s a stro n g pr eferen ce in Pol and fo r an Am e rican -l ed NA T O w hic h is able to execu te Article 5" (10 13-1014) . Thus, P olan d 's geo po litica l situ atio n as a state very vulnerable to atta ck d o es seem to nec essitate its having t he stronge st fo n n of sec u rity available . Poland 's o bj ectio ns to ESO P in clud ed concerns th at "the E U wo uld be dupli catin g existing struc tures and thi s wo uld weak en th e alliance" as w ell as th e fact that " D efense Minister Ja nusz O nyszk iew icz criticized th e EU plan as.. .lackin g in m ilitary and operatio na l viability" (Z abo ro wski and Longhurst 101 7). T h us, it is no surp rise th at Po land was less th an e nt h usiastic abo ut a poli cy w hic h seemed to them to bo th threat en th e wea keni ng of existing d efense st ruc tu res while o ffering som ething less effec tive in exch an ge. As stated in a 2003 Ca zeta Wybo rcza articl e, " the US .. .
[is] th e on.ly real gua rant o r of Poland's Polish Atlanticism in the 21st Century security, as COIIIIIIOII foreign and security poli cy remains largely o n paper, and Paris and Berlin's attem pts to dev elop a policy aimed in fact against the U S weaken ... NATO" (" Iraq to Prevent Alienating EU partn ers, Poland H as to Become Inv olved in B uilding a C omm on For eign and Security Poli cy") . Thus, at least until 20 04 , th e Pol ish seeme d to view ESOP as some t hing m ore aspirati onal th an fun ction al.
T his perceived lack of viability was un acceptable in the face of what the Poles felt to be th e co nt inued threat of Ru ssian aggression, how ev er unlikely. For instance, among th e reaso ns provid ed by one Polish j ournalist for Poland to "tighten its allian ce with Washington" on security matters was th at " R ussia is regaining its balance" (" Analyst Views Arguments For , Against Polish Involv em ent in US-Le d Strike o n Iraq .") In sho rt, Poland did not feel it had th e luxu ry at the tim e to take its c hances o n a sec ur ity syste m less established and ro bust th an NATO .
Thu s, in the years lead ing up to 2004, it is clear that variable calculations of o ppo rtunities for leadership , eco no m ic cost-benefit analysis and viability were far from absent in influ en cin g Poland's decision to vehemently advocate the primacy of NATO over ESOP. Conseque ntly, the Polish stance on the matter was not solely a result of intransient ethnic, histori c and ideol ogical bonds. Therefore, Poland's suppo rt for US leadership in security and defen se matters, vis a vis NATO , does not e nable its classificatio n as an unquestioning, un shakable Atlanti cist. but as a savvy and deliberate o ne.
POLISH ATLANTICISM: SUPPORT FOR US FOREIGN POLICY IN IRAQ
The seco nd most visible way in whi ch Poland demonstrated its Atlanticist tend en cies between 1999 and 2004 was through its near-faultless supp ort of U S foreign poli cy. The m ost co mpe lling exa mp le of thi s is Poland 's ve he me n tly pro-US position o n th e issue of Iraq . H owever, as w ith ESOP, a closer exa m ina tio n o f the m oti vation s behind th is o rientati on w ill o nce again reveal that Poli sh Atlant icism was not so blind nor so auto matic as it ma y have seemed, and was in part dri ven by strategic m oti vation s rather than solely by int ransient bonds.
During this peri od, Po land favored a w o rld in which th e United States led, a preference whi ch extended even to explicit end orsem ents of US hegem on y. For instan ce , in a Janu ary 2003 visit to West Point , President Kw asnie wski "a pplauded the United States's [sir] leading role in th e w orld , statin g th at it is both 'unquestionable and that it sho uld be exer cised" (Z aboro wski 7). Additionally, in the years follow ing Septem be r 11th , Poland was " one of the very few European countries prepared to un conditi onally support Ameri can forei gn policy" (Zab or owski 8). This pro-US alignment on issues of global politi cs peaked in 2003 in the context of th e Iraq conflict. Ind eed , at this m oment in history, nev er had Poland 's relati on ship with th e US been so close, suppo rt been so stro ng nor the contrast with o the r nati ons been so drawn . In light of thi s, 2003 can be viewed as th e peak of Poland 's Atlant icism, While the US battled to gain acceptance for their proposed in vasion in Iraq , Poland's backing on this divisiv e issue was vigorous. In 2003 Poland "fa mo usly joined Britain, Spain, Italy , Portugal [the C zec h Republic and Hungary] and D enmark in publishin g an open lett er in sup po rt of Pr esident Bush's policy toward Iraq" (jacob y 24')). This loyalty was all the m ore noti ceable when co nt rasted with th e outright oppos itio n the US encounte red from o the r Atlanti c allies. " France and Germ an y, whi ch had led th e resistan ce to US and Br itish polic y in Iraq, interpreted this... [lett er] as contrary to th e European and , inde ed , the http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/12 EU lin e . . . Fren ch president j acques C hirac . . .fum ed th at th e C EE states 'co uld hardl y have fou nd a better wa y' of '[diuuni shing] th ei r chances of e nte ring Euro pe " (jacob y 249). T hus, to som e ext ent Iraq represented a dilemma in which Po land had to cho ose between pleasin g th e po wer -players of an EU in whi ch they were in th e process of joining, and remaining tru e to th eir histori c Atlanti c ties. T he fact th at Poland c hose to back th e US o n this issue , espec ially at a time wh en th eir place withi n the E U was being dete rmined . wo uld seem to em phasize th eir stro ng Atlanti cism.
Poland 's support was not co nfined to th e dipl o mati c realm . T he Poles showed early on that the y were w illing to back th eir wo rds w ith military co nu ui nne nts, " Pola nd was clearly th e m ost stalwa rt suppo rter of US pol icy; the Pol ish foreig n minister had indicated by late j anuary 2003 th at Poland wo uld take part in a war wit h Iraq even w itho ut a UN resoluti on " (jacoby 250). Poland's pr o m ises were actualized in the months th at followed. T he nation 's co ntribution included th e deplo yment of " Po lish spec ial units fighting under US co mm and d uring th e co m bat o pe ration" as we ll as its subseq ue nt acce ptance of " respo nsibility for o ne of th e four occ upation zo ne in sout h-c e ntral Iraq . . .[in] Septe m be r 200r (Za borowski 11). Again, thi s support was all the m or e co nspicuo us given th e fact that th e " coalitio n of th e willin g" backing th e US militarily was by no m eans a broad collect io n of allies. In fact, " the level of Pola nd's support for US action in Iraq surp rised m any of its Euro pean allies. .. earn ing [it] the dubiou s title o f 'Am erica's T roja n donkey" (Za bo rowski 11). T he fact th at Poland was willing to risk so much polit ically to sup po rt the US wo uld seem at first to give credit to its po rt rayal as an unfailing Atlanticist.
It was this intense lo yalty, tangible military support, and background of western C ontinental criticism w hich caused man y leaders o n both sides of th e Atlant ic to posit th at Am erica was shifting th e nexus of its Atlant ic ties from its histor ic allies in t he west, to a m ore-receptive east. In 2003 , "Poland [had] be en praised and brand ed in th e US as a 'new European ,' [by Rumsfeld] as o pposed to the 'old Euro peans' .. .wh o o pposed US policy o n Iraq" (Za bo rows k i and Long hurst 10 10). Poland und oubtedl y stood o ut as th e poster child of th is " new Europe. " As Preside nt B ush stated in 2003 , " Was hi ngton had ' no better frien d in Europe ' " (" Analysts Ex pec t Ne w E U Members' Suppo rt fo r US to W an e").
In view of both th e trend of w estern Continental det achment from Was hington as we ll as o ve rt co nde m nation of its suppo rters , the int ense friend ship kindled bet ween Poland and th e US during thi s tim e co uld lead some to charac te rize Po land as an unqu estioning and un com promising Atlanticist. H ow ever, as was th e case wit h ESO P, a closer scruti ny of so m e of th e 11I0re strategic motives that prompted Poland 's stanc e reve al that its pro-U S o rient ation on Iraq was significantly influenced by calculatio ns of how best to maximize nati on al int erest at th e tim e, rath er than being solely dri ven by i ntra nsient histori c, eth nic and ideological ties.
The first of the se tran sitory m oti vation s w as Po land's econ om ic cost-b en efit analysis of involvement in Iraq. T o at least som e ex tent, Pol and was influ en ced by consi deration of th e financi al ben efits their support would entail. For instance, jacob y states that "several Poli sh elites . . .spoke candidly abo ut th eir desi res to see Polish firm s win lu crati ve co nt racts in th e reco nstruction era" (253) . In 2003 , Polish leade rs were definit ely cogniza nt of th e possibility that their diplom atic and military sup po rt for Am eri ca would be rewarded w ith profitable o ppo rt unities for Poli sh co m panies. Additionally, th en-foreign mi nister Wl odzimierz C imoszewicz we nt so far as to say th at wh en deciding to bec ome involved in Iraq, the Polish govern ment "wa nted Polish petroch emi cal co m pa nies to finally gain direct access to so urces Polish Atlanticism in the 21st Century of petroleum " (Cwieluch) . These expectatio ns we re enough that had th ey been m et , th e initia l Polish expen d iture in sup po rt of th ei r ally wo uld have yielded very high gains instead of losses. The im age o f Poland " an[ing] as a loyal, co nsiste nt alliance partne r" o ut of complet ely altru istic motives is further m arred by th e fact that " the Am ericans pa[id] for everyt hin g" in th e wa y of lo gistics, troop transportati on , qua rtering co st and even the cost associate d wit h financing the reco nstruct ion of the stabilizatio n zon e (Cwieluch). Finally, as was m ent ion ed earlier in regard to security m att e rs, Poland' s support fo r US foreign po licy in Iraq also e ntailed dec reased Am erican expectations of Po land's contri butio ns to NA TO , in terms of expensive m odernization m easur es and mil itary upgrades (jacoby 232). Thus, suppo rting th e U S in Iraq see nled to repre sent a mi nim al sho rt term cos t w hile pro m ising a very large payoff in bo th th e near future and lon g run . It is no stre tch to say that the se co nsidera tio ns were a significant facto r in Poland 's decision to sup port th e US, m aking its alignme nt seem less aut o m atic and dr iven by a regard fo r histo ric bon ds.
A second factor tha t points to Pola nd as less th an un con diti on al in its suppo rt was th at thi s backing was to som e ex tent mot ivated by a desire to assume a po sitio n of leadership. In order to sec ure th eir position in th e world , states must accum ulate pow er. Poland is no exceptio n; " [o] nly 15 years after regaining its sov ereignty, Poland continu es to be uncertain of its place .. . an d [is] de te rm ine d to be recogn ized as a m ajo r Europ ean player" (Zaborow ski 8) . T he rift bet ween t radi tiona l Eur op ean power poles suc h as Fran ce and Ge rma ny, and the U S over Iraq represented to Poland a rare and valuable cha nce to diffe rentia te itself from western C o ntinent al Europe and to align w ith a some wha t isolat ed hegemon. As a Warsaw Rzeczpospolit a articl e states, because "of thi s split. .. t he rank of Po land as a US partner in creased beyon d all ex pec tatio ns" ("Articl e D iscusses Imp act of Alliance with US .. . "). Poland 's heightened im po rtance to the US, its leaders presum ed , wo uld translat e into tan gibl e opportun ities to assert influence and practi ce leadership (as well as stre ngt hen norms of mutual defense with th e US) . As a result of its suppo rt , Z aborow ski and Lon ghurst state, Poland " is likely to be amon g th e group of states shaping th e new Eu rop e and its foreign po licy" (1010) . By some acco unts th e n, Po land believed th e U S wo uld reward Poland 's loyalty by sponsorin g it in becouung a leader in its regio n . ln contrast, E ur o pea n po w er-players such as Fran ce seeme d poised to limit any mov em ent o n the part of the Pol es to exercise initiative and leadership. as is e vide nced by C hirac's dem eaning remo nstratio ns of Poland 's diplo ma tic support of US foreign policy in Iraq in 200 3 . J acob y em phasizes the fact th at Po land saw Iraq as a m eans to expa nd its influ en ce and sho w lead ership when he states th at , in reference to Polan d 's inv olvem ent, "bein g a poli cy-maker on the w o rld stage was m ore rewarding th an being a policy-tak er o n the E uro pea n one" (233) . Participatio n in Iraq , th en , seeme d to Poland to offe r th e oppo rt uni ty to shed its cloa k of an oft-do minated nati on and assume a ma ntl e of responsibility in th e wo rld .
Thus, in th e face of the preponderance o f economi c and political benefits w hich participati on in Iraq appeared to offer Poland , it wo uld be diffic ult to characterize Po lish support on t he issue as a m ani festatio n of its un qu estio ning lo yalty to th e U S. It see ms highl y likely that the calculatio ns of th ese expect ed gains m ot ivated th e Po lish positio n to some extent, rather th an it solely bein g driv en by an inflexible rega rd for histo ric and ethnic bo nds. Thus, Pola nd' s Atlanticism in term s of su pport for US fore ign poli cy was ind eed "instinc tua l", but in th e sense th at it is the fund am ental instinc t of every state to maximi ze their inte rest.
In co nclusio n, in view of th e previously stated m otives behind Po land 's pro-US ori enhttp://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/12 ration o n both sec urity matters and for eign polic y, it see ms th at Polish Atlanticism was m or e shrew d than it w as blind. This evidence points to Polish Atlauti cism as bein g driven to so me extent by strateg ic calculations rath er th an solely by the oft-c ited historical , ethni c and ide ological ties. But perhaps the most clear-cut confirmation for Polish Atlanticism bein g not as inflexible as was assumed is its relativ e, nuanced decline after 2003. The followin g section will briefly examine the decrease in Poland 's level of supp ort for the US in the securi ty and foreign poli cy secto rs that has occurred in the years after 2004 so as to furth er solidi fy the claim that Polish Arlanticism prior to 2004 was more tran sient than formerly th ou ght.
DECLINING ATIANTICISM: A DIMINISHED PREFERENCE FOR NATO?
As stated previously, Poland 's position on the ESOPI NATO issue has served as som ething of a bellwether for Polish Atlanticisrn in the securi ty and defense arena. While Poland still remains highly loyal to NATO, th ere appears to hav e been a decrease in th e vehement rhetoric from Polish leadership about NATO's suprema cy ove r ESOP which cha racterized the years befo re 2004 . After this point, " a change in attitude in Warsaw towards ESOP and CFSP becam e appare nt" (Zabor owski 19). While th e Polish position has never been so clear-cut as to co nsist of total co nde m natio n o r unrestrained advocacy of ESDP, th ere doe s seem also to ha ve been an incr ease in co nstructive en gagement with ESDP development. Illustrative of this trend is Poland 's " [suppo rt for] th e creatio n of an EU Armaments and Research Agen cy (which it has sinc e joined)" (Zaborowski 20).
If a m ark of Poland's pro-US o rient atio n in the years leading up to 20 03 was its level of devoti on to American-dominated avenues of security, th en Polish Atlanticism could besaid to have suffered a moderate. yet telling, decline after thi s point. In retrospect, this then sugge sts th at Poland's Arlanti cism before and during its 2003 peak was not so inflexible as it ma y have appeared at the tim e. Ind eed, m any o f th e same transient and m or e calculating motives th at prompted Poland 's pro-US stance on security matters in th is earlier peri od can be used to explain Poland 's subseq ue nt nuanced shift in alignm ent.
One suc h variable influ en ce was Poland's changing calculations of o ppo rtunities for influence and leadership within th e two security system s. The year 2004 ma rked th e beginning of a new era for Poland as an EU member rath er th an prospective candidate. [uihich] has been evident ill~Varsall" s illcrl'asill}~/)' positive attitude towards ...
developillg the [ESDP]" (Z aborowski 5).
As stated in the previous sectio n , a large factor behind Poland's reserv e to ward ESOP included co nce rns that Poland's for eign policy would be dominated by EU power-players, a situati on in compatible with "Warsaw]s]... ambition to playa constructive and important role within th e EU" (T rzaskowski, " Fro m C andidate to Member State" 37) . H owever, on ce in the EU , Poland began to realize that it could become o ne of the se very p ower players. C o m bined with its position as o ne of the largest new member nati on s, Poland 's "experience in Iraq has heightened Poland 's profile in terms of. .. ability to carry o ut a variety of operations" (Duke 9) . Becaus e of the role it played in Iraq , "other member states.. .came to see Warsaw as natural member of th e European leading gro up" (Zaborowski 21) . Although at first resented by some EU leaders , Poland's combat parti cipation in Iraq has led these same Polish Atlanticism in the 21st Century nations to recognize it J S J promising co ntributo r to European security struc tur es. This th en has led EU lead ers to ex te nd to Poland the opportunity to be a seriou s for ce w ithin ESDP . Also , it was ann ounced in 2004 " that Poland wo uld becom e th e major contribu tor to a]n ES D P] battle group " formed jointly with G erman y (Za borowski 21), a plan which also spea ks to Poland 's in creased engagem ent w ith ESD P. Thus, th e sam e impulse to ex ert influ en ce in collective security affi lirs that led Poland to vehementl y defend the prima cy of NATO prior to 2004 led to the subsequent relaxation of its hard-line Atlanticist stance o n the issue in 2004, after its calculatio ns of lead ership opportunities within ESDP changed . Again , Poland 's nuanced ret reat from such an un compromising position o n the primacy of NA T O and gradual warming to ESDP furth er substant iates the co ncl usio n that Poland's pro-US o rie ntatio n was not so unc ompromising as W ;IS first pre sumed .
Additionally, th e eco no mic cost-ben efit analysis of contributi on s and gains whi ch drove much of Polish Arlanricism on ESDP w as materially altered afte r 2004. In tenus of ben efits, cooperation o n th e issue of ESDP with its biggest ad voca tes, such as Fran ce, promised improved rapp ort between Poland and m ore establish ed Eu ropean power-p oles. This co uld o nly help J new EU member such as Poland, who "need s [the] support and good w ill of the stro nge r partners. [German and Fren ch] assistan ce is go ing to be ... need ed o n m att ers.. .suc h as adm itt ing Poland to th e Sch en gen agreement and the monetary uni on " (" Art icle Discusses Imp act o f Alliance w ith U S o n Poland's Position in EU "). After its EU ascen sion , more constru ctive e ngagem ent o n ESDP seemed to carry with it finan cially lucrative benefits.
AJso , as stated previou sly, America had "rradj ed] away pressure o n the newer NATO members to upgrade th eir military capabilities... in exc hange for . . .politi cal loyalty" in the years leading up to Iraq (lacob y 232). This m eant th at Poland co uld parti cipate in a co llecti ve security system th at at the time seem ed at the time to be a mu ch lower cost than wh at contributing to th e de velopment of ESDP wo uld entail. H owever, o nce thi s pol itical support seg ued into Poland 's increasingl y burdensome involvem ent in Iraq, (as th e next secti on will explore), Poland's calculations of NATO's costs ch an ged . Additionally, it was stated in 2003 that "once the seco nd wave of[NATO] enlargement tak es place, Poland will be judged o n an equal footing with older m embers and wiJl thus be assessed on issues of defe nse spe nding and deplo yability of its arm ed for ces 1110re sever ely " (Z abo ro wski, "B etw een Po wer and Wea kne ss" 9). After 2004 , it was not as clear to Poland w hether th e U S would co ntinue to be so len ient in terms of ex pec ted contribution s to NATO. especially in th e face of America's decreasing fixation o n CEE political loyalty (an issue which will be addressed in t~e following sectio n). Thus, Poland 's calculations of th e financial benefits of in creased engagement wi th ESDP rose whil e its ex pectatio ns of th e di sadvantageous present and future costs associated with NATO increased . C onsequently, th e sam e economic m otives whi ch demonstrate th at Polish Atlanticism before 2004 was not so blind as it seen led also ex plains so m e of Poland 's subtle wanning to ward ESDP after thi s point.
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Lastly, there ha ve been so me alterations in Poland's calculatio ns of both th e respecti ve effectiveness o f ESOP and NATO , and the seriousness of pot ential security risks, whi ch prompted Poland 's zealo us prefer en ce for NATO prior to 2004 . For instan ce, some analysts have stated th at Poland's percepti on of a Russian threat. w hich initially led its leaders to favor th e m ore-viable NATO, h ad diminished by thi s point. This was due to the (lct that "Russia, whil st still being 'a state of co ncern ' from the P olish point of view.
[was] just too economi cally int erdependent within th e EU ... to constitute a 'clear and present danger" (Za boro ws ki 25) . Thus, Poland lll ;l Y have felt it now had th e luxury to lessen its reliance on NATO , espec ially in light of th e political and economic ben efits a more op en appro ach to ESOP promi sed to hring.
Also , th ere is evidence to suppo rt the inference that ESOP ma y have see med much more viable and promising to Poland in and after 20 04. For instance. in th e fall o f 2003 , the Union completed "the first EU military operation ("Opcrmioll Artcmis") outside the European continent ... [tjhe success of {which] shows that th e EU has at least a small genuine military operation al capacity" (Uniach 3) . Additionally, "the Europeans are .. .devel oping tools th at will be of paramount importance in the fiiture to fulfill th e goals of strat egic auto no m y. As an example ,... the y w ill have ab out 15 reconnaissance satellites .. .. in th e next 5 years" (Boy er 7). Thus, the pro spects o f viahie and fully op eration al ESD P increa sed greatl y after 2003. Ther efore . it is not at all improbable to presunle th at Poland's nuanced shift in their stance o n ESOP had something to do with improved evaluatio ns of its defense viability, giving Pol and th e leeway to lessen its uncompromising stanc e o n the preferability of NATO. As it did in their initial decision to go to Iraq, econ omic considerations played a key role in Poland's stance after 2004 . Mu ch of their decreased suppo rt can he attributed to the rising costs associated with invol vement, co upled with the disappointment of unre alized anticipated ben efits . The first o f th ese was the political cos t of Polish loyalty to the US, which fostered resentment on the part of France and G ermany which Poland co uld ill afford as newcom er to the EU. As Elizabeth Pond puts it, " [tjthe Poles ... realiz ed .. .they would need to sell their cherries and co m put ers in Frankfurt, not Houston" (54) . The direct costs of Iraq also turned out to he higher than was predi cted. " [A] fter a year in th e desert, [the PolesJ discov ered that. . .they were in over their head s with this magnitud e of responsibilPolish Atlanticism in the 21st Century iry... even with . . . US fimding for their e ffo rts" (Pond 54 ). T o m ake m att ers worse, Am erica started to decrease th e libe rality of t his fun d ing . "Duri ng th e thi rd rot atio n [of Polis h troo psI th e Am ericaus radic ally sh ut off th e sup ply of 1l 1OII ey," stat es a Warsaw Po lirvka journalist (Cwicluc h). Finally, th e eco no m ic ben efits of Polish invo lvem en t largel y failed to mat erialize . When reco nstru ct ion begJn , th e co nt racts wh ich Polish firm s had anricip ared wi n ning " turne d o ut to be ex ceedi ngly hard to co me by" (jaco by 253). T o co mp lete th is pic ture of foiled hop es, Presiden t Bus h rejected Pres ident " Kwas nie wski' s direct person al appeal for an end to visa o bligatio ns for Polish visitors to th e U nited Stat es" (jac o by 253). A decrease in Po land's willingness to maint ain loya l sup po rt of Ame rica in the face of disappointed expectations and rising cost s is unders tand able . H o we ve r, it also serv es as ret roactive co nfirma rion that th e previous level of Polish At lauticism o n this issue was ne ither unqu estioning no r unequivocal, but was to so me ext ent m otivated by transient calc ulatio ns of national int erest.
Al so, as discu ssed earlier, much of Poland's initial de cision to su pport t he US in Iraq can be attributed to expecta tio ns that thi s wo uld help them gai n th e positio n of a favored ally and leader of a " new" pro-Am erican Euro pe , en tailing expanded aven ues for influe nce. However, thi s hope co uld no lon ger enco urage Po lish suppo rt whe n U S and " old " Europe began to embark on a co urse of gradua l rapp ro chement. By 2004, "both di plomacy and auto nomo us eve nts were nudgin g th e t wo sides of th e Atlantic-a nd new and o ld Europe-toget her " (Pond 52). As the dam age do ne to relation s by the initial wav e of we ste rn Eu ro pean anti-US rheto ric be gan to he al, it be came apparent that th e rift in whi ch th is "Ne w Euro pe" hoped to insert itself was closing, and with it, Polish dreams for most-favo red ally statu s. In reference to Pr esid ent B ush's 2005 ree lec tio n , a Po lish jou rn alist wrote " hi s team ... [no w] co nsists . .. of inrernation alists striv ing to reb uild relation s wi th th e " old " E uro pe . The 'n ew ' o ne was left in the lu rch " (C wieluch).
CONCLUSIONS
In the years after 2003, th e histo ric, ethni c and ide ological fo undations of Polish AtIanr icism remai ned un cha nged. W hat had been altered was Poland 's polit ical, eco no mic and strategic cost-benefit calculatio ns of a ve hemently pro-U S alignm ent in th e sec urity and foreign policy sectors. Thus, a not -insignificant part of Poland 's Atlanricism prior to 2004 was grou nded in eva luatio ns of nation al interest m aximizati on, an d canno t b e characterized .IS an instinctual pro clivity to unqu estioningl y su ppo rt Am erica du e to unch an geable ties. This is furt her sup ported by the fact th at Poland 's Atlanti cism suffered a sub tle bur notable decline after 2004, wh en this ori entat ion no lon ger see m ed as promising in te rms of furtherin g Pol and 's influence, eco no mic pro spe cts and sec ur ity in th e world of states .
H owever , relati ve to o ther E uropea n nation s, Poland rem ains o ne of th e U S's stro ngest allies. It is simply that its zea lo us le vel of sup port for th e U S W ' IS unten able in th e face of divi sive challenges, such as Iraq, an d m assive changes , suc h as Po land's e ntry into th e EU . The sam e variable facto rs of interest calc ulatio ns w hic h led to the shift in Po land 's ori ent ation m ay change ye t agai n . Th erefore , it is no t at all imp rob able to say tha t a heightened aw arene ss of a Russian threat after th e August War co uld send Polan d back to its forme r positio n of dedi cated and exclu sive devot io n to NATO w ith its Article 5 guara ntees and U S Anned Forcesbacking. Also, the rece nt inaugu ration of an America n president more pop ular in Eu rope and 1I10 re incl ined to ward multilareralism signi ficantl y de creases the probability of situat ions in w hich Poland wi ll be forced to choose bet w een a Scylla of the US and C harybdis of the EU , as was th e case wi th Iraq . Thus, o nl y time w ill tell w hethe r Po land's http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/12
